

BEFORE THE POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO

IN THE MATTER OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST)		
SERGEANT ROBERT MURRAY,)		No. 12 PB 2814
STAR No. 1896, DEPARTMENT OF POLICE,)		
CITY OF CHICAGO,)		
RESPONDENT.)		(CR Nos. 1017705)

FINDINGS AND DECISION

On August 7, 2012, the Superintendent of Police filed with the Police Board of the City of Chicago charges against Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “Respondent”), recommending that the Respondent be discharged from the Chicago Police Department for violating the following Rules of Conduct:

- Rule 2: Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department.
- Rule 6: Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.
- Rule 8: Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty.
- Rule 9: Engaging in any verbal or physical altercation with any person, while on or off duty.
- Rule 14: Making a false report, written or oral.

The Police Board caused a hearing on these charges against the Respondent to be had before Thomas E. Johnson, Hearing Officer of the Police Board, on December 12 and 13, 2012, and January 10, 2013.

Following the hearing, the members of the Police Board read and reviewed the record of proceedings and viewed the video-recording of the testimony of the witnesses. Hearing Officer Johnson made an oral report to and conferred with the Police Board before it rendered its findings and decision.

POLICE BOARD FINDINGS

The Police Board of the City of Chicago, as a result of its hearing on the charges, finds and determines that:

1. The Respondent was at all times mentioned herein employed as a sergeant of police by the Department of Police of the City of Chicago.

2. The written charges, and a Notice stating when and where a hearing on the charges was to be held, were served upon the Respondent more than five (5) days prior to the hearing on the charges.

3. Throughout the hearing on the charges the Respondent appeared in person and was represented by legal counsel.

4. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Charges for the following reasons: (a) “the lengthy, unnecessary and inexplicable delay in IPRA’s [the Independent Police Review Authority’s] investigation of this case warrants dismissal”; (b) “IPRA’s investigation violated Section 2-57-070 of the Municipal Code of Chicago”; and (c) “it is not possible for the Board to conduct a meaningful review of the facts of this case due to the lengthy delay between the alleged incident and the hearing.” The Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is **denied** for the reasons set forth below.

a. Delay in IPRA’s investigation. The Respondent argues that IPRA failed to fully comply with the provisions of Sections 2-84-430 and 2-57-160 of the Municipal Code of Chicago and the Police Department’s General Order 08-01, which require a prompt and thorough investigation of alleged misconduct.

In fact, these provisions do not set an absolute deadline within which investigations must be completed. There is a requirement that if investigations last more than 30 days, the

investigator must seek and obtain an extension of time within which to complete the investigation.

Here, the investigator regularly did seek, and was granted, extensions of time.

Once the investigator completed the process of gathering evidence, the matter is reviewed at several levels to ensure that a thorough investigation was conducted, as required by the above provisions.

There was no substantial violation of the Municipal Code or Department directives in this case. Even if, however, they were violated, there is no provision in the Code or directives requiring the extraordinary remedy of dismissal of the case as a sanction for such a violation. The Board declines to extend the reach of the Code and directives in this manner.

The Respondent also relies upon *Orsa v. City of Chicago Police Board*, 11 CH 08166 (March 1, 2012), and *Morgan v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation*, 374 Ill.App.3d 275, 871 NE2d 178 (1st Dist. 2007) to argue for dismissal of his case.

Morgan, however, involved a delay in *adjudication* of allegations of misconduct after the plaintiff had been suspended from his job—not delay in the *investigation* leading to the initial suspension. *Morgan* involved a clinical psychologist accused of sexually abusing a patient, where the state took fifteen months to decide the case after the suspension. The Respondent's case before the Police Board is different from *Morgan*, as the Respondent in his Motion is complaining about the delay from the time of the incident to the bringing of charges, not the time it took to try him once the charges were filed and he was suspended without pay. This difference is important because the due-process analysis in *Morgan* is triggered by the state's decision to deprive the psychologist of his job, thus preventing him from working for a prolonged period of time before he was accorded the opportunity to have a hearing and decision to clear his name. Here, the Respondent was working and was being paid a full salary and benefits during the entire period of

the investigation and up to the filing of charges with the Police Board. The Due Process clause precludes a state or local government from “depriving any person of life, liberty or property [i.e. a public job] without due process of law.” Here, the Respondent was not suspended without pay until *after* the charges against him were filed. Therefore, the Respondent was *not* deprived of a job prior to the filing of charges, and any delay in bringing the charges is therefore *not* a violation of the Respondent’s due process rights.

We recognize that the Circuit Court of Cook County in *Orsa* found that the protections of the Due Process clause are triggered by an unreasonable delay in the investigation of a matter, even if the officer retains his job, salary and benefits during the investigation. The Court cited *Stull v. The Department of Children and Family Services*, 239 Ill.App.3d 325 (5th Dist. 1992). *Stull* involved a teacher accused of sexually abusing two of his students. The statute and regulations governing DCFS investigations of child abuse provided strict time limits on the length of any investigation and on the time within which a hearing must be conducted and a decision entered if the adult found to have abused children sought a hearing. The *Stull* court found that DCFS had grossly violated these time limits and required expungement of the adverse finding against the teacher, even though the administrative appeal found that he had been properly “indicated” as an abuser. The *Stull* court did find that the teacher’s due process rights had been infringed, but it was not because of a delay in DCFS’s investigation of the case. The court held that due process was violated by the more than one-year delay in adjudicating the teacher’s appeal because during that period of time there was an indicated finding of child abuse lodged against the teacher and this finding prohibited him from working, *see* 239 Ill.App.3d at 335, thus triggering the kind of deprivation that is not present in the Respondent’s case. *Cavaretta v. Department of Children and Family Services*, 277 Ill.App.3d 16 (2nd Dist. 1996), also cited by the Circuit Court, is identical to

Stull, which it relies upon. The *Cavaretta* court was quite careful to find that due process was not implicated until DCFS (after its investigation was complete) “indicated” the teacher as a child abuser and placed the teacher’s name in the state’s central registry, which directly deprived the teacher of the ability to work.¹

b. Municipal Code Section 2-57-070. The Code provides that if the Chief Administrator of the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) does not conclude an investigation within six months after its initiation, the Chief Administrator shall notify the Mayor, the City Council, the complainant, and the accused officer. The Respondent argues that IPRA did not comply with this provision of the Code.

It is not clear from the record whether IPRA provided notification to the Respondent. Even if, however, notification was not made or was untimely and this provision of the Code was violated, neither Section 2-57-070 nor anything else in the Code states that dismissal of a Police Board case is the sanction for failing to make the report to the Mayor, the City Council, the officer, and the complainant. It is unpersuasive that such an extreme sanction would automatically follow, particularly where the alleged misconduct under investigation is as serious as it is here. There is no basis for the Board to dismiss the charges pursuant to Section 2-57-070, and the Board declines to extend the reach of the Code in this manner.

c. Meaningful Review of Facts. The Respondent argues that it is not possible for the Board to conduct a meaningful review of the facts of this case due to the lengthy delay between the

¹ The Circuit Court also cited *Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), but only in general terms. There was no issue in *Loudermill* that a deprivation, for due process purposes, had occurred as it involved the discharge of school district employees.

alleged incident and the hearing. In effect, the Respondent is arguing that the doctrine of laches should apply here in supporting the dismissal of charges, for he argues that the delay in bringing the charges against him resulted in prejudice to him.

Laches is an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent a party in litigation from enforcing a right it otherwise has because it has not been diligent in asserting this right and the opposing party has been prejudiced by the delay. Private parties and public agencies are not on an equal footing when it comes to the application of the laches doctrine. Many cases, including *Van Milligan v Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Glenview*, 158 Ill.2d 85, 630 NE2d 830 (1994), hold that laches can only be invoked against a municipality under “compelling” or “extraordinary” circumstances. In addition, the party that invokes the doctrine of laches has the burden of pleading and proving the delay and the prejudice. *Hannigan v. Hoffmeister*, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1074 (1st Dist. 1992). Under Illinois law, the Respondent must demonstrate that the unreasonable delay in bringing this case caused material prejudice to the Respondent; the Respondent must submit evidence in support of his claim of prejudice (for example, testimony that witnesses could no longer recall what happened, or affidavits stating that records had been lost or destroyed during the intervening years). *Nature Conservancy v. Wilder*, 656 F.3d. 646 (7th Cir. 2011).

The Respondent has made no specific showing of any prejudice that resulted from a delay in bringing charges before the Police Board. He argues that witnesses’ memories have faded over time, and so their testimony will be less reliable or believable. In fact, however, the witnesses provided statements close in time to the events in question. At the hearing, they were able to recall and testify as to what happened. The Respondent also argued that witnesses cannot be located. However, he produced no evidence and made no specific showing that he was prejudiced by their

unavailability. He says he could not secure the testimony of retired Lt. McLaurin, but this only went to Respondent's concussion-like symptoms after the incident, which were independently established by his testimony, the testimony of his brother, and Sergeant Murray's medical records. He also says there was a civilian witness interviewed by IPRA (Lauren Mart) who could not be located, as she apparently moved out of town; however, there is no indication as to what testimony Ms. Mart would have offered that would have assisted the Respondent in this case. Consequently, any argument that there may be favorable witnesses out there, or that material evidence was overlooked and is now unavailable, is speculative.

The Respondent therefore has not demonstrated any "compelling" or "extraordinary" circumstances warranting a dismissal of his case, and has not carried the burden of proving that he was prejudiced by a delay in the bringing of charges.

5. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 2: Any action or conduct which impedes the Department's efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department,

in that:

On or about June 12, 2008, at approximately 0215 hours, at 3512 North Clark Street, Chicago, Sergeant Murray, by his overall actions and conduct, did bring discredit upon the Department, including when he engaged in a verbal and physical altercation with Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada, and/or punched Daniel Gonzalez, and/or directed profanities and threats at Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada.

The Board finds that Sergeant Murray engaged in a verbal and physical altercation with Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada at about 2:15 a.m. near 3512 North Clark Street in Chicago on June 12, 2008, but does not find the evidence sufficient to prove that Sergeant Murray initiated this

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altercation. The Board further finds that, after the initial altercation which led to the arrests of Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada, Sergeant Murray punched Mr. Gonzalez without justification while Mr. Gonzalez was handcuffed in the back seat of a Chicago police vehicle. The evidence also demonstrates that Sergeant Murray directed profanities and threats at Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada during the incident.

The initial verbal and physical altercation in front of 3512 North Clark Street is captured on a video-recording (Superintendent Ex. No. 4). Sergeant Murray, Nelson Sada, and Daniel Gonzalez, as well as those who witnessed the altercation, all agree that a verbal argument gave way to a fight involving Sergeant Murray and Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada. While it may be that Sergeant Murray should have walked away from or otherwise de-escalated the verbal exchange that gave rise to the fight, the evidence is not sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Sergeant Murray precipitated either the verbal or physical part of the altercation. In particular, the Board notes that Sonia Olvera (a friend of Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada) testified that Gonzalez and Sada were drunk. Kelsey Sanabria, a most convincing witness, related that one of the “Hispanic guys” in the altercation threw a lighted cigarette at Sergeant Murray. None of the independent witnesses knew who started the fight. In any event, the video-recording clearly shows that Mr. Sada threw the first punch.

There is no question, however, that Sergeant Murray directed profanities at Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada. The sergeant admitted doing so in his statement to the Independent Police Review Authority. Joel McCarthy Jacamo, a witness to the fight, also confirms that the combatants on the street were swearing and threatening each other.

The gist of this case, however, is what happened after Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada were handcuffed and put in the back of the squad car by responding Officers Wayne Keneipp and

Veronica Murillo. Sergeant Murray testified that his only contact was with Mr. Sada. The sergeant says he merely entered the back of the police car to prevent Mr. Sada from sliding his handcuffs under himself and bringing the handcuffs to the front of his body, in order possibly to escape. The sergeant says that after making sure Mr. Sada was handcuffed behind his body, he slid Mr. Sada back into his seat. The Board finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sergeant Murray's testimony is not truthful. There are several reasons for the Board's finding.

First, civilian witnesses at the scene (other than Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada) convincingly testified that they observed Sergeant Murray enter the back of the police vehicle and strike Mr. Gonzalez. Joel McCarthy Jacamo and Edi Garcia both clearly observed this conduct. Sonia Olvera, who candidly admitted her friends (Gonzalez and Sada) were intoxicated, saw the sergeant lean into the car and observed him wrestling with the arrestees. Kelsey Sanabria also saw the sergeant in the back of the squad car "wrestling around."

Second, Daniel Gonzalez clearly suffered significant injuries. There are photos and medical records documenting his injuries (Superintendent Ex. Nos. 2 and 5). Sergeant Whitmore arranged for Mr. Gonzalez's treatment at the hospital. While Sergeant Murray testified Mr. Gonzalez incurred all of these injuries during the fight on Clark Street, multiple credible witnesses testified they saw no blood on or injuries to Mr. Gonzalez prior to his arrest and confinement in the squad car. These included Joel McCarthy Jacamo, Edi Garcia, Kelsey Sanabria and Sonia Olvera. Even responding officer Wayne Keneipp did not observe blood on Mr. Gonzalez when he put him in the squad car. The Board finds that Mr. Gonzalez' injuries occurred in the squad car.

Third, after emerging from the squad car, Sergeant Murray spoke directly to several of the witnesses in an animated fashion, asking "if anyone else wanted some of this," and saying that if he had his gun, he would have shot someone. The witnesses, including Mr. Jacamo, Mr. Garcia,

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Ms. Sanabria, and Rafael Anzures, are consistent in describing these threats. These are not the words of someone who has merely prevented someone from changing the way in which his hands were cuffed.

Fourth, neither of the responding officers (Keneipp or Murillo) corroborated Sergeant Murray's testimony that Mr. Sada was seeking to escape. Nor did they testify that Sergeant Murray ever told them about Mr. Sada trying to maneuver his handcuffs into a position where he could escape.

Fifth, Sergeant Murray had been engaged in an altercation with Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada. He was a complaining witness against them. If Sergeant Murray observed a problem with Mr. Sada's handcuffs, there was no reason for him to go into the squad car himself and seek to remedy the situation. Officers Keneipp and Murillo were both on the scene and nearby. The arrestees had been subdued. Sergeant Murray could easily have brought the situation, if it existed, to the attention of Officer Keneipp or Murillo, rather than become physically involved with prisoners he had just fought on the street, while off duty. A sergeant reasonably should know that this was inappropriate.

For the reasons set forth above, the Board finds that Sergeant Murray, without justification, punched Daniel Gonzalez while Daniel Gonzalez was handcuffed in the back of a squad car and directed threats and profanities at Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada.

6. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 6: Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral,
in that:

On or about June 12, 2008, at approximately 0215 hours, at 3512 North Clark Street, Chicago, Sergeant Murray failed to follow the provisions of General Order 02-08-05, Section II.A.1., when he failed to complete a Tactical Response Report regarding his physical contact with Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada.

In his testimony, Sergeant Murray conceded he did not fill out a Tactical Response Report (TRR) following the incident with Messrs. Gonzalez and Sada on June 12, 2008. He had filled this kind of report out in the past and knew how to complete the report. The General Order makes it clear that the sergeant should have filled out a TRR on June 12, 2008. While Sergeant Murray complains of concussion-type symptoms from the altercation, he worked a full day on the day after the incident. As such, there was ample opportunity to fill out a TRR in a timely fashion.

7. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 8: Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty,

in that:

Count I: On or about June 12, 2008, at approximately 0215 hours, at 3512 North Clark Street, Chicago, Sergeant Murray punched Daniel Gonzalez while Daniel Gonzalez was handcuffed in the back of a squad car.

See the findings set forth in paragraph no. 5 above, which are incorporated here by reference.

8. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 8: Disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty,

in that:

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Count II: On or about June 12, 2008, at approximately 0215 hours, at 3512 North Clark Street, Chicago, Sergeant Murray directed profanities at Daniel Gonzalez and Nelson Sada.

See the findings set forth in paragraph no. 5 above, which are incorporated here by reference.

9. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 9: Engaging in any verbal or physical altercation with any person, while on or off duty,

in that:

On or about June 12, 2008, at approximately 0215 hours, at 3512 North Clark Street, Chicago, Sergeant Murray engaged in a verbal altercation with Daniel Gonzalez and/or Nelson Sada which led to a physical altercation between them, and Sergeant Murray punched Daniel Gonzalez while Daniel Gonzalez was handcuffed in the back of a squad car.

See the findings set forth in paragraph no. 5 above, which are incorporated here by reference.

10. The Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, charged herein, is **guilty** of violating, to wit:

Rule 14: Making a false report, written or oral,

in that:

On or about March 3, 2010, in the offices of the Independent Police Review Authority ("IPRA") Sergeant Murray made a false statement to IPRA when he said that he did not punch Daniel Gonzalez while Daniel Gonzalez was handcuffed in the back of a squad car.

See the findings set forth in paragraph no. 5 above, which are incorporated here by reference.

11. The Police Board has considered the facts and circumstances of the Respondent's conduct, the evidence presented in defense and mitigation, and the Respondent's complimentary and disciplinary histories, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Board determines that the Respondent must be discharged from his position due to the serious nature of the conduct of which it has found him guilty.

Sergeant Murray punched Daniel Gonzalez while Mr. Gonzalez was handcuffed and sitting in the back of a squad car. Sergeant Murray also swore at Mr. Gonzalez and Nelson Sada and threatened them, saying that if he had his gun, he would have shot someone. Sergeant Murray did all this in front of members of the public, and while Mr. Gonzalez was in the custody of police officers whom Sergeant Murray outranked. Sergeant Murray's actions were reckless, violent, and unjustified. Sergeant Murray was out of control, and he demonstrated a complete lack of judgment.

In addition, Sergeant Murray's disciplinary history includes a sustained complaint stemming from an off-duty incident that took place approximately one month prior to the incident that led to the charges in this case. As a result of the May 8, 2008, incident, Sergeant Murray was suspended for conduct unbecoming an officer.

Sergeant Murray's conduct on June 12, 2008, and the lack of control and lack of judgment he has demonstrated, are incompatible with continued service as a sergeant with the Chicago Police Department. The Board finds that returning him to duty as a sworn officer, armed and authorized to use deadly force, would pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of the public.

The Board finds that Sergeant Murray's conduct is sufficiently serious to constitute a substantial shortcoming that renders his continuance in his office detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service of the Chicago Police Department, and is something which the law

recognizes as good cause for him to no longer occupy his office.

POLICE BOARD DECISION

The Police Board of the City of Chicago, having read and reviewed the record of proceedings in this case, having viewed the video-recording of the testimony of the witnesses, having received the oral report of the Hearing Officer, and having conferred with the Hearing Officer on the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, hereby adopts the findings set forth herein by the following votes.

By a unanimous vote, the Board denies the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the charges.

By unanimous votes, the Board finds the Respondent guilty of violating Rule 2, Rule 6, Rule 8, Rule 9, and Rule 14.

As a result of the foregoing, the Police Board, by a unanimous vote, hereby determines that cause exists for discharging the Respondent from his position as a sergeant of police with the Department of Police, and from the services of the City of Chicago.

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NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent, Sergeant Robert Murray, Star No. 1896, as a result of having been found **guilty** of charges in Police Board Case No. 12 PB 2814, be and hereby is **discharged** from his position as a sergeant of police with the Department of Police, and from the services of the City of Chicago.

DATED AT CHICAGO, COUNTY OF COOK, STATE OF ILLINOIS, THIS 21st DAY OF MARCH, 2013.

/s/ Demetrius E. Carney

/s/ Scott J. Davis

/s/ Melissa M. Ballate

/s/ William F. Conlon

/s/ Ghian Foreman

/s/ Rita A. Fry

/s/ Susan L. McKeever

/s/ Elisa Rodriguez

Attested by:

/s/ Max A. Caproni
Executive Director
Police Board

DISSENT

The undersigned hereby dissent from the Findings and Decision of the majority of the Board.

[None]

RECEIVED A COPY OF
THESE FINDINGS AND DECISION
THIS ____ DAY OF _____, 2013.

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

1 / 1 Main Report
100%

Chicago Police Department
Personnel Division
**Only for active personnel*

Report Date: 06 Aug 2012
Report Time: 1317 Hrs

Information Services Division
Data Warehouse
Produced by: IL01656AEC

Complimentary History


Name	Title	Star	Unit	Detail Unit	Emp Number
MURRAY, ROBERT J	9171	1896	002	376	

Achievements

DEPARTMENT COMMENDATION
2009 CRIME REDUCTION AWARD
EMBLEM OF RECOGNITION - PHYSICAL FITNESS
JOINT OPERATIONS AWARD
HONORABLE MENTION
POLICE OFFICER OF THE MONTH AWARD
2004 CRIME REDUCTION RIBBON
TOTAL AWARDS

Total No.

7
1
1
1
45
1
1
57



BUREAU OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS SECTION

3 August 2012

TO: COMMANDING OFFICER UNIT 113-IPRA
FROM: RECORDS SECTION
BUREAU OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: PREVIOUS SUSTAINED DISCIPLINARY HISTORY OF:

MURRAY, ROBERT J. 1896 002/376
NAME (LAST, FIRST M.I.) STAR UNIT

M W [REDACTED]
SEX RACE EMPLOYEE #

REFERENCE: COMPLAINT REGISTER # 1017705

THE PREVIOUS DISCIPLINARY RECORD OF THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN
REQUESTED IN YOUR NAME BY:

DEPUTY CHIEF ERIC MELLENBACH [REDACTED] 113/IPRA
RANK NAME STAR EMP# UNIT

RELATIVE TO A SUSTAINED FINDING IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
ABOVE REFERENCED COMPLAINT REGISTER NUMBER.

THE RECORDS SECTION, BUREAU OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS,, DISCLOSES THE
FOLLOWING DISCIPLINARY ACTION(S) ADMINISTERED TO THE SUBJECT
ACCUSED, FOR THE PAST FIVE (5) YEARS.

VERIFIED/PREPARED BY:

P.A. CHRISTINA FABIAN#17699
FOR: COMMANDING OFFICER
RECORDS SECTION
BUREAU OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS

SPAR-NONE
CR-SEE ATT'D

Sergeant Robert Murray

Findings and Decision

IADR118

03-NOV-2012 10:51:45 AM

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sustained Complaints History Report

<u>Social Sec. #</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Star #</u>	<u>Emp. #</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Unit</u>
[REDACTED]	MURRAY ROBERT J.	1896	[REDACTED]	9171	SERGEANT OF POLICE	376
<u>Sex</u>	<u>Race</u>	<u>Birth Date</u>	<u>Appointed Date</u>	<u>No. Of CR's</u>	<u>No. Of SPAR's</u>	
M	WHITE	[REDACTED]	28-SEP-1998	2	0	
<u>Case #</u>	<u>Incident Date</u>	<u>Suspension Dates</u>	<u>Disciplinary Action Taken</u>	<u>Final Category</u>	<u>Less Serious Transgression</u>	
C 1020637	08-OCT-2008	17-JAN-2010	1 DAY SUSPENSION	10J-NEGLECT OF DUTY/CONDUCT		
<u>Civil Suit #</u>			<u>Police Board #</u>	UNBECOMING - ON DUTY		
<u>Comments</u>						
<u>Case #</u>	<u>Incident Date</u>	<u>Suspension Dates</u>	<u>Disciplinary Action Taken</u>	<u>Final Category</u>	<u>Less Serious Transgression</u>	
C 1016489	08-MAY-2008	18-NOV-2008	2 DAY SUSPENSION	09J-MISCELLANEOUS		
<u>Civil Suit #</u>		19-NOV-2008	<u>Police Board #</u>			
<u>Comments</u>						